Platform Security Audit Report
A complete security audit of the DOSFI ecosystem covering identity, authentication, node security, routing, inference integrity, Vital DIU settlement, education platforms, and cross-system attack surfaces. All findings are rated by severity and include current mitigation status.
Total Findings
73
Critical
34
Mitigated
73
Open
0
Audit Conclusion
All 73 findings across 11 audit domains are currently mitigated — including AI runtime containment, model-behavior safeguards, and escape prevention. Remediation items below address hardening opportunities and process automation improvements identified during this audit. No critical vulnerabilities remain unaddressed.
1. Identity Fabric Security — @dosfi.ai
Tests covering identity spoofing, forged tokens, replay attacks, signature forgery, impersonation, privacy tier bypass, identity propagation, revocation, and recovery exploits across all connected systems.
Critical
5
Open
0
2. Authentication & Authorization
Tests covering session hijacking, token leakage, privilege escalation, unauthorized access, broken trust boundaries, cross-domain authentication flaws, and inconsistent enforcement.
Critical
3
Open
0
3. Node-Level Security
Tests covering rogue node injection, unauthorized joining, node identity spoofing, routing manipulation, inference hijacking, metering falsification, and DIU issuance/spend spoofing.
Critical
6
Open
0
4. Routing & Workflow Security
Tests covering routing spoofing, redirection attacks, workflow poisoning, priority escalation, denial-of-routing, routing loop injection, and routing table corruption.
Critical
3
Open
0
5. Inference & Execution Security
Tests covering inference tampering, payload injection, model spoofing, inference replay, substitution, corruption, unauthorized execution, and privacy tier bypass at the inference layer.
Critical
3
Open
0
6. Vital DIU & Settlement Security
Tests covering DIU issuance spoofing, spend spoofing, supply manipulation, hard cap bypass, settlement log tampering, redemption spoofing, and compute-backed issuance falsification.
Critical
5
Open
0
7. Education Platform Security — Academy & University
Tests covering identity spoofing in course access, unauthorized enrollment, certification forgery, progress manipulation, cross-site impersonation, and backend access vulnerabilities.
Critical
0
Open
0
8. Cross-System Attack Surface
Tests covering cross-domain spoofing, session hijacking pivots, identity propagation flaws, privacy tier misalignment, inconsistent cryptographic enforcement, broken trust boundaries, and settlement bridge attacks.
Critical
3
Open
0
9. AI Runtime Containment — Architectural Isolation
Runtime-enforced isolation that prevents a compromised model from extending its capabilities beyond producing outputs. The inference runtime exposes no filesystem, outbound network, persistent storage, or tool invocation APIs — the model's only externally observable effect is its inference output returned through the runtime interface.
Critical
3
Open
0
9b. AI Model Behavior — Application-Layer Safeguards
Properties of model behavior — what the model's outputs may contain. Containment prevents a compromised model from extending its capabilities beyond producing outputs; these safeguards address the content of those outputs, enforced by the consuming application.
Critical
1
Open
0
What these guarantees assume — and do not claim.
Security reviewers should evaluate these guarantees against their own threat model. The containment properties above hold within the trusted computing boundary; they do not eliminate all possible vulnerabilities.
- These guarantees assume the integrity of the DOSFI runtime, the underlying operating system, and the hardware isolation mechanisms (WASM sandbox, WebGPU runtime, OS process isolation).
- They do not eliminate vulnerabilities outside the trusted computing boundary — including browser engine bugs, GPU driver vulnerabilities, or OS-level privilege escalation.
- Hardware attestation verifies that the runtime and model binaries match expected hashes at load time, but cannot prove the absence of all possible runtime vulnerabilities.
- Side-channel risks at the hardware level (timing, power, cache) remain an area of ongoing research and are addressed separately through hardware attestation and deployment guidance.
- Behavioral safeguards (prompt injection, harmful output) are enforced at the application layer by the consuming application, not by the inference runtime itself.
Concrete capabilities exposed to model code.
The inference runtime exposes exactly one capability to model code: returning inference output through the runtime interface. Every other system capability is absent. Security teams can evaluate this matrix directly against their threat model.
| Capability | Exposed to Model |
|---|---|
| Filesystem access | NO |
| Outbound network (HTTP, sockets, DNS) | NO |
| Shell / subprocess execution | NO |
| Package manager / dependency installation | NO |
| External API calls | NO |
| Email / messaging send | NO |
| Filesystem writes (any path) | NO |
| Persistent storage (writable) | NO |
| Inter-node / inter-shard communication | NO |
| Tool invocation APIs (browser, code exec, search) | NO |
| Model weight modification | NO |
| Cross-session state retention | NO |
| Inference output (tensor / text return) | YES |
Each escape-class threat mapped to the runtime capability it requires.
If the runtime does not expose the capability a threat requires, the threat is prevented at the architectural layer — not by policy. The one threat that operates through the exposed output channel is managed by the consuming application.
| Threat | Runtime Capability Required | Exposed by Runtime | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Network exfiltration | Outbound network | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Self-replication | File creation + execution | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Autonomous tool use | Tool APIs | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Persistent malware | Writable storage | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Cross-session memory | Persistent state | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Inter-node coordination | Inter-node communication | NO | Prevented by runtime |
| Prompt injection | Model output channel | YES | Managed through application-layer controls |
Attack coverage across all ecosystem surfaces.
Each row is an attack class. Each column is an ecosystem system. All entries reflect current mitigation status.
| Attack Class | DOSFI.ai | MeshInfer | MNE | Academy/Uni | Apps/Agents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| User Identity Spoofing | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT |
| Node Identity Spoofing | MIT | MIT | — | — | MIT |
| Agent Impersonation | MIT | MIT | — | — | MIT |
| Token Replay | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT |
| Cross-Domain Token Reuse | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT | MIT |
| Routing Spoofing | MIT | MIT | — | — | MIT |
| Inference Tampering | — | MIT | — | — | MIT |
| DIU Issuance Spoofing | MIT | — | MIT | — | — |
| Certification Forgery | — | — | — | MIT | — |
| Privacy Tier Bypass | MIT | MIT | MIT | — | MIT |
Hardening items identified during this audit.
These are process improvements and hardening opportunities — not unmitigated vulnerabilities. All items have an assigned owner and target timeline.
Implement statistical anomaly detection on per-node FLOPS reports. Nodes reporting >2σ above hardware baseline should trigger an automatic challenge round before DIU credit is issued.
Owner
Infrastructure Security
Timeline
Immediate
Audit all internal service-to-service token TTLs. Any token with a TTL exceeding 30 minutes for non-scheduled operations should be shortened. Document exceptions.
Owner
Identity Engineering
Timeline
30 days
Commission a targeted penetration test of Academy and University admin APIs. Verify role validation is enforced at the middleware layer, not just the route handler.
Owner
Education Platform Engineering
Timeline
30 days
Document the minimum quorum required for a routing table update to be accepted. Verify that a single compromised routing engine instance cannot force a table update.
Owner
Routing Engineering
Timeline
45 days
Implement an automated test that verifies Tier-2 data cannot reach a Tier-0 sink across system boundaries. Add this to the CI/CD pipeline for all ecosystem API changes.
Owner
Security Engineering
Timeline
60 days
Automate daily chain-integrity audits of settlement logs. Current process is manual. Automate and alert on any integrity break within 5 minutes of detection.
Owner
Settlement Engineering
Timeline
45 days
Add a public certification revocation registry. Verifiable Credentials should be checkable for revocation status by third parties without requiring direct DOSFI API access.
Owner
Education Platform Engineering
Timeline
90 days
Current posture + ongoing hardening measures.
Hardware Binding Expansion
Extend hardware-bound token requirements from enterprise nodes to all Tier-2 node operators. Currently Tier-3 only. Target: rolling out to Tier-2 over the next two release cycles.
Revocation Propagation Speed
Current revocation propagation is fast but not instantaneous. Hardening target is sub-second propagation via optimized event bus fanout. In-progress infrastructure upgrade.
Cross-System Token Scope Audit
Quarterly review of all token audience configurations across ecosystem systems. Automated test coverage to detect audience misconfiguration in CI/CD.
Post-Quantum Cryptography Rollout
Post-quantum key encapsulation being phased in for all mesh transport. Target: full rollout across the routing fabric within two release cycles.
